

Indonesian Foreign Policy Maintaining In Maritime Security Towards China's New Silk Road

Gizem Butun^{1*}, Yanyan Mochamad Yani², Arry Bainus³

Post Graduate Program in International Relations, FISIP, Padjadjaran University
Jl. Bukit Utara No. 25. Dago, Bandung, Indonesia

e-mail: *¹ gizembutun@gmail.com, ² yan2m@hotmail.com, ³ arrybainus@unpad.ac.id

Abstract

Indonesian Maritime Domain has overlapping area with one of the immense project which is China's New Silk Road. Thus, with providing opportunities such as financial loans and infrastructure investment which are essential to realize the appealing policy of Joko Widodo's, Global Maritime Fulcrum. However, this project doesn't seem without implications for Indonesian Maritime Security given current unsolved problems, South China Sea Dispute, IUU fishing and Natuna island. Indonesian Foreign Policy has always been on one of the main policy which is Free and Active. Also, internal and external factors such as anti-Chinese sentiment and US-China rivalry have been determinative for Joko Widodo's Policy as well. The researcher used the Qualitative research method with an explanatory approach in conducting the research and processing the data. The primary data document directly from ministries as an official statement and speech of leaders. Secondary data, written and visual sources such as scientific books or journals, archival sources, personal documents, internet sources, other official documents. This research concluded that Indonesian Foreign Policy is crucial in order to obtain benefits while reducing implications. Therefore, this research sought to establish how Indonesian Foreign Policy has been managing China's New Silk Road to maintain Maritime Security of Indonesia.

Keywords : *Foreign Policy, Maritime Security, Silk Road*

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

In recent years, with technological improvements, international trade and globalization in maritime have increased maritime income significantly. Therefore, maritime has become a significant area for each country to rise its welfare, especially for coastal or archipelagic states. As a one of the largest country archipelagic states in the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia is located at where major sea lanes connect East Asia, South Asia, and Oceania, with having crucial straits such as Malacca Strait, and plenty of natural resources. Therefore, Indonesian position is incredibly important given the change about the pivot area of world is to Asia-pacific and one of the biggest projects, BRI as well. This project has two main components which are economic belt that refers to mainland area announced in September 2013 and 21st Maritime Silk Road that describes ocean route announced right after one month in Indonesia by leader of PRC (People's Republic of China), Xi Jinping. These two announcement are often recognized as the "yidai yilu" policy in Chinese or the official commencing of China's new Silk Road initiative (Ye, 2015: 217). Having impact on 65 countries, and with budget approximately \$4-8 trillion, China's passionate Belt and Road initiative is the greatest of all bi projects (Desjardins, 2018: 2). To carry the recognition BRI one step further on 28 March 2015, in Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, China's National Development and Reform Commission also issued an action plan for the Belt and Road, entitled the "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road". The official document

organized the primary goals of the "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) Initiative which turns BRI subsequently. OBOR aims to support the regular and free flow of the economy and proficient allocation of resources with deep integration of markets. Additionally, it promotes the countries to accomplish economic policy coordination and perform broader. Moreover, regional cooperation of higher standards and jointly builds an open, comprehensive, and balanced regional economic cooperation (Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, 2017).

To turn Indonesia maritime country again and with the effect of China's New Silk Road, at 9th East Asia Summit in November 2014 Indonesian President Joko Widodo declared Global Maritime fulcrum (GMF), which later became main of the Indonesia's maritime policy between 2014-2019 (Damuri et al., 2019). President Jokowi underlined 5 pillars to perform GMF: maritime connectivity, via accelerating maritime infrastructure development, advancement of transportation facilities, Maritime Economics; to manage and maintain the nation's maritime resources Indonesian maritime culture; reconstructing Indonesia's national identity as a maritime country, maritime diplomacy; to design of soft power in to handle with regional threats and growing bilateral and multilateral collaboration in the maritime sector; maritime security, to strengthen Indonesia's maritime defense in order to secure Indonesian territory (KAMINFO, 2016)

To carry out GMF fully, Indonesia has to solve lack of infrastructure problem in particular in terms of maritime connectivity such as ports and sea highways project and to improve especially less developed island including rural areas which also one of the

nine point in Nawa Cita. However, Indonesia's government budget is not able to fund all the investment project solely by itself. Thus, China's huge BRI fund such as Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is offering for loans to the participated countries including Indonesia that can be resulted in convergence between two projects in term of connectivity. The fact that to employ BRI completely, China certainly needs Indonesia in the Maritime Silk Road considering at Indonesia is located at one of key points of MSR (21st Maritime Silk Road) that comprise both Indian and Pacific Ocean. Consequently, Jakarta has attended both BRI and AIIB with receiving one of the highest loans so far. However, receiving high loans by China has increased concerns among both public and elites due to the "Debt Trap Policy" and historical untrust. Apart from that, there are existed maritime problems between Indonesia and China that haven't been solved yet such as China's assertive attitude in South China Sea recently and nine-dash line claims with violating Natuna island's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and IUU(illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing are the most known.

Regarding this, the goal of this study to examine the Foreign Policy of Indonesia in the pursuit of national interest in maritime domain while maintaining maritime security towards China's New Silk road.

1.2 Purpose and Objectives

The goal of this research is to analyze Indonesia's reply in the form of foreign policy between 2014-2019 in maritime security concept towards BRI policy with consequences such as BRI infrastructure investment and illegal

fishing. This study will completely explain foreign policy and the maritime security approach, especially as regard of a country like Indonesia. This research is important for comprehending and considering policy of Indonesia to be able to create strategies in the future to face China's BRI policies so that it can reduce the implications to Indonesia's maritime security. As a result of that, this research examines foreign policy of Indonesia in dealing with BRI.

This research is anticipated to maintain novelty and offer strategic options connected to Indonesia's foreign policy to diminish Indonesia's maritime security problems such as inequality of maritime sector problem in the future as much as possible. It is hoped that the research findings can be connected support Indonesian foreign policy instruments arrangements that effectively respond to the China's New Silk Road.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Foreign Policy

Since, globalization and the current progress of the international nature of foreign policy problems, a state has been affected by various features to have complete authority on the consequences of its decision due to the geographical or global circumstances. This situation leads the country to regulate its foreign policy to fit with the growing multilateral nature in the entire area and demonstrate national interests in a higher intensity than before. At present, vital issue directly related to the national interest that were previously low profile or not considered as obligatory are now having more attention. For instance, as regards the state's obligation to protect its

citizens' prosperity, also other issues related to democracy and human rights (Widjojo, 2005: 6).

It is obvious that all country's foreign policy is affected by two main determining factors, namely external (international) and domestic (internal) factors. These two factors are seen which assist in shaping and forming a country's foreign policy. As regards the relationship between external and internal factors, international relations and foreign policy analysis researchers have long discussion whether the two are mutually exclusive or independent or, both are interdependent and overlapping affair. As a structure of intercourse at the international level, foreign policy is about the interaction of one country with other countries; the study of foreign policy cannot disregard international factors in its discussion. Thus, the factors of international relations such as international systems and structures of global domination, international law, international organizations, alliances, strength, and military competitions between nations in the region cannot be negligible. (Bojang, 2018).

Moreover, a country's internal habitat impacts on the nature and direction of its foreign policy in diverse road. The internal environment relates to the country's size, socio-economic and cultural improvement throughout history, and the political regime that affects the country. However, differences in political institutionalization and social structures, differences in military capabilities, and differences in strategic cultural directions also define foreign policy's character. In addition, differences in public points of view, understanding of the state's role, rules of decision regulation, and the personality and tendency of a country's political leaders also diversify the nature and destination of

foreign policy from one country to another. Therefore, it is finalized that the material of a country's foreign policy always arise from domestic and foreign political issues (Union of International Associations, 2020).

2.2. Maritime Security

By scholars of International Relations and Security, "Maritime Security" is often considered as a concept that is too wide. Thus, over last few decades, the concept of maritime security has become a great topic of discussion including many researchers to search and improve it. Yet, there are a number main units in maritime security deriving from the international, public, and private sectors whose primary targets are; (Feldt et al., 2013: 2):

- maintain the freedom of the sea,
- facilitate and sustain trade, and
- maintain good governance at sea.

Recently, the maritime security approach has been gradually more discussed the fact that the strategic role of a country's waters is highly increased, in particular regarding the mobility function and economic benefits of every country in the world.

The extent of maritime security issues is vast and varied increasingly influential to one another, ranging from to freedom of navigation, safety at sea; natural disaster phenomena at sea; transnational organized crimes at sea, to issues showing relevant to the environment at sea (Cozens, 2010: 157). Non-traditional maritime security threats such as maritime terrorism; Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing; radicalism; piracy; arms smuggling; human smuggling and trafficking; and environmental pollution in the sea, are no longer the control solely of the navy in many countries

yet the responsibility and the domain of the coast guard's mission and marine policies (Burroughs & Mazurek, 2019: 9)

Besides of non-traditional security threats, maritime security is also originated in the concept of marine safety. The concept of marine safety describes as an attempt to supply ships and marine installations' safety to protect marine professionals and the marine environment which rose the value of seaports. Moreover, maritime security is also certainly related to economic development issues. The sea is an essential part as a shipping route, trade route, and the fulfilment of natural resources such as fossil fuels and mining materials from the seabed. Some of the components of maritime security are; sovereignty-territorial integrity and political independence, International and national peace and security, security of Sea Lines of Communications, security protection from crimes at sea, resource security, access to resources at sea and to the seabed, environmental protection, security of all seafarers and fishermen (Feldt et al., 2013: 3)

Maritime security positively requires state capability in defining policy facet, whether to cooperate or not; which country will perform mutual operations with; how to regulate fixed general maritime rules that unite military and civilian; and how to set maritime defence and security policies (United States Government, 2010: 18). Nevertheless, UNCLOS is confirmed by 167 countries that has decided an agreement among all stakeholders that national territorial waters are 12 nautical miles (nm) from shore to sea, with some countries demand 24 nm. United Nation Convention Law of Sea (UNCLOS) explains this as a "contiguous zone" of limited rights and responsibilities. There is also a more important territory in

maritime security which the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The EEZ is up to 200 nm away, where some countries are in effort to broaden this zone for economic targets relating to the continental shelf up to 350 nm. These different assertions constantly damage maritime security elements resulting disputes and dynamics in global maritime security.

3. Methods

This research will be applied an explanatory qualitative research methods. A qualitative approach is applied because it can express particular causal relationships and explanations in interactions between countries. To brief, a qualitative method was selected to support reliability as defined by Creswell, i.e., it permits researchers to debate social phenomena holistically, strengthen continuous introspection, and support the use of complicated reasoning that is multifaceted, repeated, and synchronous research strategies (Creswell, 2013: 213). This study will use two type of data sources, firstly primary sources and secondary sources. The first source will acquire from official documents by relevant ministries, institutions and speech, statements by leader and officials. Secondary sources obtained from written and visual sources such as scientific books or journals, archival sources, personal documents, internet sources, other official documents, as well as news in electronic media such as television news etc.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 The Features of Indonesian Foreign Policy and Indonesia-China Relations

From independency to present, Indonesian foreign policy has been undergoing several and significant periods and has been affected by various factors such as international environment, Internal-external aspects with diverse approach of leaders towards China.

One of the main principles that affects and design Indonesian Foreign Policy is "free and active" since independence (Defence Ministry of The Republic of Indonesia, 2015). "Free" refers that Indonesia does not take sides with major powers that are discordant with the nation's character and identity. At the same time, "active" means that Indonesia is not passive in to implement foreign policy and answering to international situations that comprise it.

To begin with, after the end of "New Order" period, in the context of Indonesia-China relations, a new period has begun showing good relations between the two since late 1999, in which both attained momentum after the inauguration of President Abdurrahman Wahid where Indonesia demonstrated an expression to construct a higher relationship with China after a long time. (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, 2004). This moment emphasized to strengthen economic relations between the two countries. This situation continued similar with Megawati, but in 2005, during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration, China became Indonesia's fifth-largest trading partner, which resulted in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries aimed at cooperation not only in the fields of investment and trade but also technology (Sukma, 2009: 93).

Under Jokowi administration, for the first time China has surpassed Japan as trade partner of Indonesia. Indonesia-China

relations have become more active in several area, and intense in particular in the economic field where investment and aid in China's Belt Road Initiatives (BRI) Program for infrastructure projects is welcomed by the Indonesian government. In numerous meeting, Indonesia emphasized its interest in maritime connectivity. In the Indonesia–China High-Level Meeting on People-to-People Exchange Mechanisms, China remarked that Indonesia is the leading country in Southeast Asia to enhance for bilateral collaboration in negotiating economic, political, and person-to-person perspectives security exchanges (Utami, 2016).

Moreover, on 22 September 2015 at the Centre for Education and Training (CET) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, the Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia Xie Feng, in his statement underlined that Indonesia-China cooperation through the China MSR Program could significantly strengthen Indonesia's GMF. This plan can be done through several main agendas, such as providing financial assistance, technological developments, and increasing the volume of China's production (Xie Feng: Hand in Hand for Common Development, 2015). However, internal (domestic) and external factors have always been affective to design foreign policy in particular such a diversified community with being one of the highest-populated country that are namely:

a. Internal factor

Throughout history of the Indonesia-China relation, major domestic factors are historical untrust, anti-Chinese sentiments, elites' perspectives who are skeptical towards China, in particular in Pribumi elite

group who shows adverse stand to President Joko Widodo government. For example, particular head of Islamic organizations, former high-ranking official, public intellectuals, scholars. Some argued that the intention of BRI infrastructure development in Indonesia is managing strategic area. For example, China's wish to finance the Sunda Strait bridge where there is a linkage with Sumatra between Java was seen as a signal of such gain. Since, it is the second shortest way from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean after the Malacca Strait (Herlijanto, 2017: 4). Also, In the first period of Joko Widodo, pro-people diplomacy and inward looking approach is more dominant due to the fact that lack of economic capabilities and infrastructure were one of the domestic factor causing welcoming approach to China's BRI. Moreover, with the increase of influx of Chinese labor after a plenty of Chinese Direct Investment in Indonesia and the fear of economic domination by China are new obstacles for Joko Widodo welcoming policies.

b. External Factor

As it mentioned above, Asia-Pacific is an attractive area worldwide as a result US has been trying to be influential actor for regional countries to stabilize the region via reducing China's rising affect in the pursuit of US national interest and also with maritime patrol US making contribution for maintain good governance and at facilitate trade. Indonesia-US relations is not recent for instance in "New Order", Indonesia had interaction with US especially in terms of having financial loans. The cooperation with US will hinder Indonesia being too dependent on just one power. Nevertheless, withdrawal of Trump from Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

caused more space to China's influence in the region especially under massive project, BRI.

Due to the high-number of economic agreements between Indonesia-China put China in an economic partner meanwhile given IUU fishing and Natuna Island EEZ violation which most of time by China. These problems are the obstacles to proceed relations between two countries.

In 2015, minimum three illegal fishing vessels from China in Natuna waters were sunk by the Minister of Maritime Affairs which referred to "shock therapy", and Ministry Susi Pudjiastuti stressed that Indonesia is taking action against crimes by other countries in its waters, and stealing fish is a crime (BBC, 2016) She marked that the goal is to get rid of crimes in Indonesian waters. Following the protests by China, Susi told that Indonesia's action against fish thieves, not the state in particular.

Moreover, in fishing town of Tanmen in Hainan, Xi Jinping suggested fishermen to "not only lead fishing activities but also collect marine information and support the development of islands and coral reefs" in the Natuna waters certainly causing threats for Indonesian Maritime Domain. Not surprisingly in October 2013, Chinese fishermen is supplied financial and political assistance for fishing activities in the controversial waters to support China's nine-dash line claim. As a reaction, besides to the sinking of the ship and the legal process, Indonesia also abandon the some bilateral fisheries cooperation agreed by the two countries at that year (Zhao, 2015).

Minister Susi's solid attack was a kind of confuted by Joko Widodo on April 13, 2016, when Song Tao, head of the Chinese Communist Party's international

department, met President Joko Widodo in the midst of Natuna incidents. In the end of meeting, Pramono Anung, Cabinet Secretary, said that “the matter is considered resolved and is also considered a misunderstanding, and in the future, China and Indonesia will respect each other’s territorial waters”

Also, this statement is unclear and was not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but instead the Cabinet Secretary. It was also announced that “Jakarta and Beijing expressed a strong desire to improve relations at all levels (Suryadinata, 2016: 8). There is a concern whether too much economic dependency on China can affect Jakarta’s approach such as being too soft against China’s violation or not.

In 2016, exceedingly 90% of raw oil volume transferring along the South China Sea on route the Strait of Malacca, leading to be one of the world’s main oil transit chokepoints due to the most brief sea route between supplier in markets in Asia, Persian Gulf and Africa. In addition, a considerable amount of raw oil (about 1.4 million b/d) stream through the strait to Singapore and the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, where it is convert before passing the South China Sea in the form of petroleum products (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2018.) Maritime traffic in the South China Sea is a continuation of the ALKI (Indonesian Archipelago Sea Lane), which crosses the Malacca Strait. Thus, because it is in contact with ALKI, which is under the sovereignty Indonesia, indirectly maritime traffic around the South China Sea is also part of the implementation of the GMF. (Fitriyanti, 2019: 80).

4.2 Indonesian National Interest and Policy in Maritime Domain between 2014-2019

In order to become a maritime power again and realize the Jalesveva Jayamahe (in the ocean we triumph) motto, GMF suites for Jokowi’s first period to build up Indonesia as a maritime country. The GMF also aimed to reconstruct the country’s maritime culture and widen the maritime economy, presenting a national policy and development agenda via five pillars which extended to 7 pillar that involve maritime security and maritime economy. Joko Widodo, in his inauguration speech, said that:

"We have to work as hard as possible to turn Indonesia into a maritime nation once again. Oceans, seas, straits, and bays are the future of our civilization. We have turned our back on the seas, oceans, straits, and bays for far too long. It is time for us to realize "Jalesveva Jayamahe," "in the ocean we triumph," a motto upheld by our ancestors in the past. We want to make that happen again." (Widodo, Inauguration Speech, 2014).

The fragile and ambiguous structure of maritime has brought maritime security in a new concept especially with the increase of globalization that boosted trade and shipping activities in maritime domain including non-traditional threats. Therefore, maintain the freedom of the sea,

facilitate and sustain trade, and maintain good governance at sea has become crucial pillar of maritime security (Feldt et al., 2013: 2). In order to employ these pillars, maritime connectivity has become prominent which needs improved infrastructure.

Consequently, President Joko Widodo has constantly emphasized that in under his governance infrastructure investment is one of priority given lack of infrastructure investment in Indonesia, additionally connectivity is one of the pillar in GMF to carry out other pillars such maritime security and maritime economy for instance the number of high quality of port in Singapore is higher than Indonesia which resulting in international trade ships' preferences to Singapore. Furthermore, the less of connectivity between islands decreased development in east islands as well. In this case, BRI meets for Indonesia's needs which aims to receiving financial loans especially for infrastructure subsequently connectivity. Also, Indonesia has other funding options for investment such as US and Japan.

In order to develop the capacity in international market and internal connectivity to be able to achieve the less developed improvement, Sea Toll Policy has become one of the important element of GMF. In addition, to enhance the people productivity and competitiveness in international market, and with the growth of internal connectivity to maintain even distribution of development. Also, all infrastructure investment is predicted to reduce logistic costs. Sea Highway program will also include 160 non-commercial ports as a sub-feeder of Sea Highway, building 50 pioneer shipping and 193 pioneer shipping routes (Sriyanto, 2018: 5)

Thus, to carry out one of the main pillars, infrastructure investment, numerous topics are planned in the National Medium-Term Development Plan (2015–2019). In the maritime infrastructure development sector, to construct 24 new seaports and 60 new ferry ports including ferry ports and capacity building for more than one hundred and fifty inter-island ports issued by the Indonesian government has set an ambitious target. Indonesia also needs ferry ports and capacity building for more than one hundred and fifty inter-island ports (BPKP, 2021).

Therefore, on March 1, Presidential Regulation (Peraturan Presiden) No. 16 of 2017 on Indonesian Sea Policy in launched to escalate realize GMF policy, "In the accompany of this regulation, Marine and human resource development; Environmental protection, and ocean space management was added to GMF with 76 programs containing several ministries and institutions. The seventy-six programs were afterwards divided into 425 activities to accomplish 330 goals extending 7 which are' (Laksmana, 2017: 2).

The GMF's original pillars were expanded into:

- Marine and human resource development;
- Naval defence, maritime security, and safety at sea;
- Ocean governance institutionalization;
- Maritime economy, infrastructure, and welfare;
- Environmental protection and ocean space management;
- Nautical culture; and
- Maritime diplomacy.

However, overlapping key roles and functions between ministries, maritime management sectors, and agencies caused lack of coordination between areas and growing sectoral egos are a major administrative challenge.

4.3 Chinese Investments under Joko Widodo Administration

With the end of New Order, Chinese Foreign Investment (CFI) has begun in Indonesia followed by rising in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono period, and accelerated in Joko Widodo first period. After the announcement BRI in 2013 Beijing has been calling all FDI project as a BRI project to collect under the same plan. Chinese Foreign investment in Indonesia mainly can be shaped which are Industrial Park, Power Plant, construction, infrastructure Investments, and e-commerce. Power, mining, manufacturing etc. are carried out commonly via Industrial Park. Industrial Park has essential status in FDI investment, which is defined as an zone run and marketed by a private or public company providing required infrastructures such as electricity, water, and a sewerage system by itself which provides advantaged for under-developed island and rural area that is desired in Nawa Cita and GMF. Furthermore, it supplies a series of sustaining services (permits, security) and property facilities. Industrial Estates in Indonesia generally offer infrastructure, special facilities, and services

China's industrial park investments is expanding along the BRI route, therefore the biggest portion is received by Southeast Asia countries. In 2015, the total stock of Chinese direct investment in Southeast Asia hit 62.82 billion US dollars which

equals 54.3% of BRI investment. In 2016, 20 overseas cooperation zones were approved by the Ministry of Commerce, of which seven were located in Southeast Asian countries along the BRI i.e., Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Indonesia. Chinese investment in Southeast Asia is mainly focus on Indonesia, Cambodia, and Thailand, with broad cooperation in mining, engineering machinery, cultivation, and building (Song et al., 2018:1294).

Industrial Park hasn't been appeared with BRI. Nevertheless, it is seen as a part of BRI in particular by China. it is clear that the places are rich of raw and natural resources for instance Morowali Industrial Park in central Sulawesi where nickel is highest resources. Beside best minerals, the expenses of logistic is diminished due to the being near to resources. As a result of that China is having countless benefits via using Indonesia's lack of investment situation and prosperous natural resources. Indonesia is one if the wealthiest nation in natural resources such as having the most natural gas reserves and gold in Asia Pacific. Also, Indonesia has abundantly palm oil, and cocoa because of having tropical seasons (Juwita et al., 2020: 211).

On the report of World Bank data, The nation's GDP increases from \$890.815 billion in 2014 to \$1.119 Trillion in 2019 (Indonesia | Data, 2019). At that situation FDI contribution can be considered logical, and China's share is rising each year.

On the other hand, Luky Eko Wuryanto, Vice President Chief Administration Officer of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), explained that at present Indonesia's depth to AIIB is US\$950 million and is

anticipated to rise as the infrastructure investment boosts (Kinanti, 2019).

Also, one of the efforts of Indonesian Foreign Policy is to secure and stabilize the region with joint trust amid countries and dynamic equilibrium that doesn't wish one sides heaviness in the area in terms of US-China rivalry. Although by two leaders emphasized convergence of MSR and GMF, since it overlaps with Indonesian waters and assertive attitude of China regarding South China Sea can be resulted in security issues for Indonesia in the future. Additionally, China's high influence on Asia Pacific region can deteriorate to freedom of navigation via possessing assets, such as happened in Sri Lanka's port due to the high dept and growing maritime traffic owing to the high possible BRI capacity in the following year.

As it mentioned before Jokowi's policy has mostly concentrate on infrastructure and attracting infrastructure investment to reduce poverty, inequality assist development (Warburton, 2016).

To sum up, Indonesian Foreign policy between 2014-2019 draws welcoming tendency towards BRI. Nevertheless, Joko Widodo is also aware of negative impact of BRI, and trying to minimize as much as possible via putting some conditions in bilateral agreements and following middle power policy to stabilize the region.

4.4 Benefits and implications of Indonesian Foreign Policy towards China's New Silk Road in Maritime Security between 2014-2019

Between 2014-2019, the Joko Widodo's main policy was to return Indonesia maritime power in the region and globally as well with growing maritime economic development to enhance

prosperity of people as it mentioned 2014 election campaign. Therefore, Global Maritime Fulcrum was planned just one year later of China's New Silk Road, additionally "middle power" policy in Asia Pacific to support security in the region and maintain stability among big powers.

In the first period Indonesia and China relations has been improved significantly. It has been called "honeymoon" of relations which demonstrated welcoming approach by Indonesian side ((Mustapa et al., 2019: 8)). Nevertheless, in decision making-process domestic and external factors have the main roles in such a varied population, and having exceedingly close relationship with China has rose concern among public which criticize Joko Widodo's policy especially productive age population while waiting to be employed. This situation has been forging anti-Chinese sentiment after high influx of Chinese labour even though for non-skilled that has been claimed in Morowali industrial park. Also, there are some concerns for construction investment in the strategic area can cause increase China's expansion in Malacca Strait. Likewise, In BRI, there are already project to bypass Malacca Strait in both via economic belt and maritime road such as Gwadar, Pakistan. It shows that that China has been in effort to build up its supremacy in maritime that having control Sea Line of communication which damage Indonesian Maritime Security. Conversely, from pro-Joko Widodo point of view, it is beneficial to have China's assist to develop maritime connectivity so that trade can be facilitated, sustain and good governance can be improved as well. However, the fear of China's economic domination in Indonesia has increased both in elites and public that can cause a hindrance in Joko Widodo's positive policy.

To stress the accomplishment in first period of presidency, In the infrastructure week 2019, Joko Widodo emphasized that in his first period it has constructed 947km of toll roads, 3,432km of highways, 39km of bridges, 10 new airports, 19 ports, and 17 dams etc.(President of Republic of Indonesia, 2019).

In addition, to preserve good governance at Indonesian waters as much as possible, monitoring a non-traditional crime is crucial. Nevertheless, Indonesia-China relations at this point haven't been successful in terms of cooperation, Since, "maritime" is primary initiative and vision, namely the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) Initiative of President Xi and the Global Maritime Fulcrum of President by Jokowi, it is anticipated that Indonesia and China would improve their maritime cooperation more. However, in the number of international treaties agreed in the maritime sector, the two international treaties signed on the maritime sector, and only one MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) was signed during Jokowi's first period presidency, namely that of the Maritime Search and Rescue Cooperation that mention maritime security(Lalisang & Candra, 2020: 11)

On the other hand, UUI fishing has been carrying on time to times by China. In one of the recent UUI incident between two country, even though China underlined that they accept Indonesian Sovereign over Natuna, it hasn't changed the fact that China's nine-dash line claim is violating Indonesian EEZ which is sovereignty of territorial water. Apart from that, China's assertive policy in South China Sea, and ASEAN's lack of conciliation in 2012 to joint declaration about South China Sea dispute showed China's impact on some

countries in ASEAN such as Cambodia's decision(Anwar,2019:154).While realizing welcoming policies by government for foreign investment such as power plants and industrial park constructions which can be essential for improving less developed island's infrastructure, it must be noted that maritime traffic of Chinese ship will become get bigger and bigger with the high mobility of China.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusions

Indonesian Foreign policy towards China between 2014-2019 is welcoming due to the huge volume of BRI infrastructure investment to accelerate both in connectivity between the islands and within the island to obtain targets of Joko Widodo governance preferential policy which is GMF. In 2014, policy of Joko Widodo was seen more inward looking to develop economy through foreign investments. As a result, foreign investments have become vital in this term. Indonesia officially attended BRI and AIIB, consequently, the volume of CFI has risen dramatically.

However, it has climbed concerns related to probable implication for Indonesian Maritime security such as China's economic domination and exploitation of natural resources. Furthermore, because of the vague economic result of BRI in long term and depth trap diplomacy which can cause China receiving possessions of strategic locations that can threaten maritime security of Indonesia. On the other hand, pro-Jokowi side's point is that collaboration with BRI can be helpful in terms of trade can be sustain and facilitated in maritime

domain due the fact that increased connectivity. Moreover, BRI investment is already had large capacity and presumably to rise more in the following years. Although Indonesia has alternative investor such Singapore, Japan and US, China's share has become progressively more. To some scholar, Indonesian economic dependency on China can cut the capability of Indonesia's answer to maritime security incidents such as China's assertive approach to South China Sea and Natuna EEZ.

It is clear that BRI is an expansion project of China in particular via CFI, and Indonesia is sharing overlapping maritime domain with MSR. Also, one of the other attractive policy Joko Widodo's in Asia Pacific is "dynamic equilibrium" to stabilize regions security due to the increased US-Sino rivalry so that heaviness of both sides in the region can be used useful in regard of Indonesian national interest.

In the end, Indonesian Foreign policy towards BRI can be considered welcoming and initiative despite of opposition to Joko Widodo. Indeed, Jakarta is also conscious of negative effect. Thus, this policy can be named welcoming in attention.

5.2 Recommendation

Based on the data collected and analysis of the research, the researcher makes the following recommendations;

In spite of the fact that Indonesia has already varied foreign investors and financial loans, China's share is still increasingly high. Jakarta should decrease the depth level or rearrange the finance contracts. Jakarta is able to achieve that due to the Indonesia's highly powerful strategic location for bargain, For example,

Malaysia renewed the some BRI projects because of high depth level recently referring depth trap diplomacy. In addition, even infrastructure investment such as industrial park, power plants contributes the infrastructure development of islands besides Java as it is desired, it shouldn't be forgotten mostly industrial park are constructed the place where natural resources are very rich. Jakarta should be aware of the long-term exploitation by China. Also, China's effort to create new routes to shortcut Malacca Strait should be considered carefully in case in long term it can be achieved. Also, high Chinese labour influx should be reduced in particular for non-skilled ones to hire Indonesian workers. Last but not least, with China's New Silk Project, Beijing's maritime traffic will reach higher number that gives more space to apply nine-dash claim, at this point being too dependent on economically can cause limitation Indonesian's response ability in long term.

References

- Anwar, D. F. (2019). Indonesia-China Relations: Coming Full Circle? In *Southeast Asian Affairs 2019* (pp. 145–162). ISEAS Publishing.
- Bojang, A. S. (2018). The Study of Foreign Policy in International Relations. *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*, 06(04), 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.4172/2332-0761.1000337>
- Burroughs, L., & Mazurek, R. (2019). *Maritime Security In The Indian Ocean: Perceived Threats, Impacts, And Solutions*.
- Cozens, P. (2010). Maritime Security and Ocean Policy. In Klein, N. et. All. *In Maritime Security: International*

- Law and Policy Perspective from Australia and New Zealand.* Routledge.
- Creswell, J. W. (2013). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches.* In *SAGE Publications* (Fourth Edi). SAGE Publications.
- Damuri, Y. R., Perkasa, V., Atje, R., & Hirawan, F. (2019). Perceptions and Readiness of Indonesia Towards the Belt and Road Initiative: Understanding Local Perspectives, Capacity, and Governance. *Centre for Strategic International Studies*, 1–40.
- Defence Ministry of The Republic of Indonesia. (2015). *Defence White Paper* (Third Edit). Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia.
- Desjardins, J. (2018). *MAPPED: China's most ambitious megaproject—The new Silk Road.* Business Insider.
- Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia. (2004). *Bilateral Relations Overview: China and Indonesia.* Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia. <http://id.chineseembassy.org/indo/zyyn/sbgxgk/>
- Feldt, L., Roell, P., & Thiele, R. D. (2013). Maritime Security-Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach Maritime Security-Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach. *ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security*, 49(222), 1–25.
- Vision and actions on jointly building Belt and Road—Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation.* (n.d.). Retrieved September 1, 2021, from <http://2017.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0410/c22-45.html>
- Herlijanto, J. (2017). How the Indonesian elite regards relations with China. *ISEAS Perspective*, 10.
- Indonesia | Data.* (n.d.). Retrieved July 20, 2021, from <https://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia>
- Indonesian navy fires on Chinese fishing boat in disputed waters. (2016, June 20). *BBC News.* <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36573291>
- Isi Lengkap Pidato Joko Widodo usai Pelantikan Presiden di MPR.* (n.d.). *Tribunnews.Com.* Retrieved August 4, 2021, from <https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2014/10/20/isi-lengkap-pidato-joko-widodo-usai-pelantikan-presiden-di-mpr>
- Juwita, M. R., Wang, T., Sukma, Y. G., Iskandar, M., & Supriyadi, A. (2020). Potentials and Challenges of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Indonesia. *NUANSA: Jurnal Penelitian Ilmu Sosial Dan Keagamaan Islam*, 17(2), 195–217.
- Kinanti, K. P. (2019, September 2). *Segini Pinjaman Indonesia di Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank | Ekonomi.* *Bisnis.Com.* <https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20190902/45/1143362/segini-pinjaman-indonesia-di-asian-infrastruktur-investment-bank>
- KOMINFO, P. (2016). *Menuju Poros Maritim Dunia.* Website Resmi Kementerian Komunikasi Dan Informatika RI. Retrieved August 3, 2021, from

- http://content/detail/8231/menju-poros-maritim-dunia/0/kerja_nyata
- Laksmiana, E. (2017, March 23). *Indonesian Sea Policy: Accelerating Jokowi's Global Maritime Fulcrum?* Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. <https://amti.csis.org/indonesian-sea-policy-accelerating/>
- More than 30% of global maritime crude oil trade moves through the South China Sea—Today in Energy—U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)*. (n.d.). Retrieved July 23, 2021, from <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36952>
- MUSTAPA, H., Ansori, F., & Juwita, M. (2019). *WORLD MARITIME AXIS AND SILK ROAD Repositioning of State Sovereignty in Indonesia-China Bilateral Relations*. Center for Research and Publishing State Islamic University of SGD.
- Situs Resmi BPKP 2021*. (n.d.). Retrieved April 18, 2021, from <http://www.bpkp.go.id/sesma/konten/2254/Buku-I-II-dan-III->
- Song, T., Liu, W., Liu, Z., & Wuzhati, Y. (2018). Chinese overseas industrial parks in Southeast Asia: An examination of policy mobility from the perspective of embeddedness. *Journal of Geographical Sciences*, 28(9), 1288–1306.
- Sriyanto, N. (2018). Global maritime fulcrum, Indonesia-China growing relations, and Indonesia's middlepowermanship in the East Asia region. *Jurnal Kajian Wilayah*, 9(1), 1–19.
- Sukma, R. (2009). Indonesia-China relations: The politics of reengagement. In *Living with China* (pp. 89–106). Springer.
- Suryadinata, L. (2016). *Singapore | 26 April 2016 Did the Natuna Incident Shake Indonesia-China Relations? 2016*, 8.
- Union of International Associations. (2020). *Yearbook of International Organizations 2019-2020*. Brill Press.
- United States Government. (2010). *Maritime Security Sector Reform*. United States Government.
- Warburton, E. (2016). Jokowi and the New Developmentalism. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 52(3), 297–320. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2016.1249262>
- Widjojo, A. (2005). Democracy, National Security and Foreign Policy. *Asia-Pacific Democracies: Advancing Prosperity and Security, 1991*, 1–9.
- Xie Feng: Hand in Hand for Common Development*. (n.d.). Retrieved April 22, 2021, from <http://id.china-embassy.org/eng/gdxw/t1298984.htm>
- Ye, M. (2015). China and Competing Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: TPP, RCEP, and The New Silk Road. *Asian Security*, 11(3), 206–224. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2015.1109509>
- Zhao, H. (2015). *China's new maritime silk road: Implications and opportunities for Southeast Asia*. ISEAS Publishing.